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The regulation and supervision of financial services has lagged behind in the agenda of the European Union (EU) until the very end of the 1990s, although there were significant differences across the various segments of the financial sector. Whereas EU banking policy was rather developed, as a consequence of the first and second banking directives, the EU regulation of securities and stock markets was minimal, with the status of the insurance sectors in-between the two (Story and Walter 1997: 23-25). Between 1999 and 2004, EU policy concerning the regulation and supervision of financial services developed from a rather minimal set of rules and ‘thin’ institutional arrangements, to a more articulated and institutionalised framework. 

This policy reform is empirically and theoretically interesting. Empirically, financial integration - and consequently, the regulation and supervision of financial activities - had traditionally been a sensitive area for the member states, as demonstrated by the fact that, despite the overall success in completing the 1992 Single Market Programme, financial services lagged behind. It will therefore remain one of the main fields of EU activity in the years to come. Furthermore, the policy has an important external dimension, as indicated by the discussions on the so-called Basel 1 agreement and subsequently the Basel 2 agreement (Kapstein 1989; Genschel and Plumper 1997; The Banker 2/6/04, 5/4/04, 5/1/04, 3/9/04, 2/8/04).​[1]​

Theoretically, the policy evolution raises the question of which approaches better account for the process and its outcome, revamping the ongoing debate on whether supranational dynamics and institutions (Sandholtz and Stone Sweet 1998; see also the neo-functionalist ancestors, Haas 1968; Lindberg 1963), or member states interests and national governments formulate policy in the EU (Moravcsik 1993, 1998, 1991; see also the state-centred ancestors, Milward 1992; Hoffman 1966). This article provides a theoretically-informed and empirically-grounded explanation of the policy reform by competitive hypothesis testing. It is concluded that sequencing different theoretical approaches - interdependence, supranational governance and liberal intergovernmentalism - explains the various stages of the process, namely, background-setting, agenda-setting and decision-making, as well as the main features of the outcome (for an overview of models of theoretical dialogue in the study of the EU, see Jupille, Caporaso and Checkel 2003). 





2. THE ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK 





The dependent variable of this research is the reform of the policy framework for regulation and supervision of financial services in the EU. Prior to 1999, the policy was based on three core principles, the first being national regulation, coupled with mutual recognition and minimal harmonisation through EU rules, though EU regulation was more developed in the banking sector (Lastra 2003; Padoa-Schioppa 1999). The second principle was the national execution of supervision with some cooperation, either bilaterally, on the basis of memoranda of understanding between regulators, or multilaterally, in the form of ‘technical’ committees. Thirdly, there were non-legally binding international rules, such as the standards set by the Committee on Banking Supervision of the Bank of International Settlements (BIS) in Basel. In addition, the so-called Basel I agreement in 1988 on the ‘International Convergence of Capital Measurement and Capital Standards’ was transposed into an EU directive, which is legally binding upon all member states. 

The EU policy framework established in 2004 is based on a complex multi-level system of EU rule-making and enhanced cooperation between national supervisory authorities, underpinned by newly created EU committees (such as the Securities Committees, set up in 2001), and by reformed committees (such as the Banking Advisory Committee and the Insurance Committee, which date back to 1977 and 1992 respectively). The functional division between banking, securities and insurance is maintained. The so-called Basel II agreement on ‘International Convergence of Capital Measurement and Capital Standards: a Revised Framework’ signed in 2004, is also to be incorporated into EU legislation.

As far as regulation is concerned, the ‘first level’ consists of the traditional Community method, whereby the Commission drafts legislation after consulting the so-called ‘level 3’ ‘advisory committees’.​[2]​ The Commission’s proposal is then co-decided by the Council of Economic and Finance Ministers (ECOFIN) and by the European Parliament (EP), laying out common EU rules and principles, in the form of either directives, or regulations. These general rules are supplemented by ‘technical’ regulations and implementing measures produced through ‘comitology’, the so-called ‘level 2’ ‘regulatory committees’ in which the Commission’s proposals are voted upon and the Qualify Majority Voting applies.​[3]​ These committees also provide advice to the Commission on draft level 1 legislation, based on the input provided by level 3 committees. Each level 2 committee has one voting national representative per member states nominated by the relevant ministry and one technical expert nominated by the relevant ministry. The Commission service chairs and provides the secretariat.







Interdependence theory highlights the importance of international and transnational exchange, which generates pressure for policy change, either at the national level, or in regional blocks (Keohane and Nye 1989; Gourevitch 1978, 1986; Fioretos 1997; Sandholtz and Zysman 1989). Interdependence is not necessarily symmetrical – some countries are more exposed and/or less able to cope than others – and this asymmetry affects power relations, which then has an impact on outcomes. 

With reference to the mode of financial service regulation and supervision in the EU, two complementary causal mechanisms can be postulated and subsequently tested. 

H1: At the EU level, the hypothesis is that the Single Market and the Single Currency substantially increased financial exchange amongst the member states, augmenting the risk of regulatory or supervisory failures with cross-border repercussions, potentially threatening the stability of the financial system and the erosion of sound regulatory standards, due to the race to the bottom. Thus, financial interpenetration made it imperative for the EU to establish a more flexible and comprehensive mode of regulation. 





According to the supranational governance approach, which to a large extent subsumed the neo-functionalist theory, the driving forces (or demand side) in the process of integration are: transnational exchange, rule-based integration and the entrepreneurship of supranational institutions, as well as the resources they possess, and which make them, and not the member states, the supply side of integration (Sandholtz and Stone Sweet 1998. For a critique see Branch and Ohrgaard 1999; Moravcsik 1998, 1993, 1991).

In the case of the EU policy on financial services regulation and supervision, the causal mechanism postulates that the transnational economic and financial exchange intensified by previous integration, together with a proactive and skilful set of supranational actors, such as the Commission, the ECB and the EP, facilitated the policy evolution. The member states were marginal actors, whose preferences were shaped, to different degrees, by the activity of supranational institutions and by the very functioning of the EU. 

Three testable hypotheses can be derived and evaluated against the empirical record. 

H 1: The member states were not in control of the reform process, whereas supranational agents, such as the Commission, the EP and the ECB played a crucial role. Process tracing based on the available historical record is instrumental in detecting the preferences and the respective degree of influence of the Commission, the EP and the ECB.​[4]​ It has to be borne in mind that the influence of supranational actors operating as policy entrepreneurs can be subtle; for example by defining problems and proposing solutions, identifying or ruling out alternatives, as well as helping member states and interest groups to (re)define their interests (Jabko 1999: 475). 

H2: The second hypothesis, which can be tested using the congruence procedure, is that the final outcome reflected the preferences of supranational actors.​[5]​ 





Liberal intergovernmentalism portrays the process of European integration as the result of a series of rational choices made by powerful national governments pursuing the interests of prevailing domestic groups (Moravcsik 1993, 1998; Moravcsik and Nicolaides 1999).​[6]​ This approach has so far been applied to treaty changes, the so-called grand bargains at the supra-systemic level of analysis (Peterson 1995b: 71), though it should be equally applicable to EU policy making at the systemic level, especially in the case of major policy reforms.

Conventionally, liberal intergovernmentalists articulate their analysis into three main steps, based on the theoretical assumption of actor-centred rationality. Firstly, there is the domestic process of national preference formation, whereby national executives aggregate domestic preferences and articulate them in EU fora. The preferences of domestic actors are determined by comparative advantages, and they are also affected by interdependence, which helps to explain the convergence of preferences across countries (Moravcsik 1998: 3-5; Fioretos 1997: 293). Secondly, intergovernmental bargaining takes place in the EU arenas, using diplomatic techniques and tools. The final distributive outcome of EU negotiations depends on the power and resources available to the member states, the size and strength of competing coalitions of states and patterns of asymmetric interdependence (Moravcsik and Nicolaides 1999: 73-76). Thirdly, there is the creation and delegation of authority to EU institutions, acting as agents of the member states, and operating to reduce coordination and commitment problems (Moravcsik 1998: 24).

In the policy study under scrutiny, the causal mechanism postulated by liberal intergovernmentalism is the following: the convergence or congruence of domestic preferences of the member states on the regulation and supervision of financial services made it possible to reach an agreement at the EU level. Intergovernmental bargaining, using traditional diplomatic resources, strategies and tactics, account for the policy process. The configuration of domestic preferences, together with the patterns of asymmetric interdependence and policy coalitions explain the outcome, located within the Pareto frontier of the member states. 

Three testable hypotheses can be derived and assessed against the empirical record. 

H1: The first hypothesis, which is evaluated through process-tracing, is that national executives, especially those of the largest member states, were the only significant actors in the EU policy-making process. Thus, national governments, rather than supranational actors, performed the function of policy entrepreneurs. 

H2: The second hypothesis, mainly assessed on the basis of the congruence procedure, is that the final outcome fell within the win-set of the main member states and tended towards the minimum common denominator. Furthermore, the EU institutions that were set up were immune from path dependency and unintended consequences, thereby preserving the full control of the principal. 

H3: The third hypothesis is that, at the domestic level, powerful interest groups, principally, the financial sector and dominant companies therein, lobbied their national governments for a reform of EU policy. This hypothesis also provides a link to interdependence, for it considers how the latter affect the preferences of domestic forces. 

3. AN OVERVIEW OF THE POLICY EVOLUTION 

In 1999, the Commission proposed a Financial Services Action Plan for the regulation of European securities markets, including a list of 42 specific measures to be adopted by the EU (Commission of the European Communities 1999a). The Lisbon European Council in 2000 welcomed the Commission’s Action Plan as part of the European Council’s overall goal of transforming the EU into the world’s most competitive economy, and moving ahead with the creation of a single market for financial services was seen as an important step in this direction.

In July 2000, ECOFIN appointed an ad hoc Committee of Wise Men, led by Alexandre Lamfalussy, to discuss the best means to adopt the Commission’s program and adapt EU regulation to an ever-changing financial marketplace. The mandate included three main elements: to assess the current conditions for implementation of the regulation of the securities markets in the European Union; to assess how the mechanism for regulating the securities markets in the European Union can best respond to developments underway in securities markets; and to propose scenarios for adapting current practices in order to ensure greater convergence and cooperation in day to day implementation, taking into account new developments in the market (Committee of Wise Men 2000: 29). It was clearly established that the Committee would not deal with prudential supervision.

The working method of the Committee was to canvass opinions from a variety of policy actors in an open way. It met members of the Commission, the ECB and Baron Lamfalussy appeared before the Economic and Monetary Affairs Committee of the European Parliament. The Committee invited the member states, regulatory authorities and the industry itself to submit contributions. It also invited leading representatives of the major constituencies of European securities markets, Trade Unions and several outstanding personalities from the financial world to confidential hearings in Brussels (Committee of Wise Men 2000: 32-35). 

The Report was completed in December 2000 and proposed the framework described in Section 1, albeit only with reference to securities. Reportedly, the Wise Men had considered the proposal of creating a single European regulator for the financial sector, but quickly concluded that creating such an agency would require years of intergovernmental negotiation, and that such an agency, if it were created, would be hampered by the continuing diversity of national regulations in the area (Committee of Wise Men 2000: 26). 

The EP endorsed the goal of the Report but, in order to increase the accountability of the Commission in the level 2 committee, revived earlier demand for a ‘call-back’ mechanism, which had previously been rejected during the negotiation of the 1999 Comitology Decision (Financial Times, 28/2/01, 7/3/01). The EP proposal was dismissed by the Final Report of the Committee of Wise Men and the large majority of governments subsequently rejected it during the Stockholm European Council in March 2001.

The question of parliamentary scrutiny was resolved in February 2002 on the basis of a compromise between the EP and the Commission, in which the EP renounced its demand for a call-back mechanism in return for a statement from the Commission President Romano Prodi assuring the EP that the Securities Committee would operate with ‘full transparency vis-à-vis EP’.​[7]​ In addition, the Commission agreed to accept the inclusion by the EP of ‘sunset clauses’, limiting the delegation of implementing powers to a four-year period, after which Parliamentary approval would be required for renewal.

Rather unexpectedly, the proposed level 2 Securities Committee also raised objections from Germany in the days before the planned adoption of the Lamfalussy Report by the Stockholm European Council in March 2001. Within the ECOFIN Council that preceded it, German Finance Minister Hans Eichel sought additional guarantees that the Commission would not use its newly gained powers under the reformed regulatory committee procedure to push through legislation opposed by a simple majority of member governments (Financial Times 22/3/01, 23/3/01). Eichel demanded a commitment that the Commission would not go against the ‘predominant views that might emerge in the Council’, in effect attempting to reintroduce the old safety-net mechanism whereby a simple majority could block a Commission decision. Such a commitment had already been made by the Commission as part of the 1999 Comitology Decision and this deliberate ambiguity was preserved in the final text prepared for Stockholm (Pollack 2003: 151. See Council of Minister 1999; Commission 1999b). Reportedly, Eichel feared that the Commission, especially DG Internal Market, where Anglo-Saxon views prevail, would push through securities legislation that would favor London over Frankfurt as a center for securities trading (Financial Times 27/3/01).





4. INTERPRETING THE POLICY HISTORY





Two main sets of structural economic factors can be extrapolated as setting the background for the reform. Firstly, the Single Market and EMU increased the interpenetration of financial markets and cross-border financial flows, triggering the formation of large-scale financial investors and challenging the traditional mode of regulation and supervision of financial services activities in Europe.​[9]​ The investment horizons of funds and private investors have become more European, and the relative share of domestic equity in portfolios of unit trusts has declined, whereas the volume and number of cross-border transactions has increased and the same investment firms constitute the membership of different exchanges and serve multiple national client bases. As Tommaso Padoa-Schioppa (2004: 73), member of the ECB Executive Board, put it, ‘there are clear signs that a single Euroland financial industry is emerging’. Furthermore, the Single Currency triggered the restructuring of the banking system, further stimulated by the enlargement of the EU (ECB 2004b, 2003c).​[10]​ These changes furthered the pressure for calls for updating the arrangements for prudential regulation and supervision in the EU. 

Other powerful incentives were the ‘expected economic benefits’ deriving from a single, more competitive, financial market, which would strengthen the EU economy and which would bring benefits for consumers (eg higher pension returns), small and medium enterprises (more venture capital), and larger companies (lower cost of capital) (Committee of Wise Men 2000: 4-8, see also Financial Times 10/11/2000). There were also expected ‘costs of non-reform’, because the existing system was too slow and rigid, and therefore it constituted a burden for the EU in the global economy, especially when competing with the US. ​[11]​  

Structural economic factors at the EU level were embedded into a global trend of financial innovation and capital liberalization. Technological innovation, which increased the speed and flows of information, and the spread of new financial instruments, such as securities, meant that financial markets changed rapidly, and the EU regulations were not up to this speed (Committee of Wise Men 2000: 9). Moreover, the creation of a single market in financial services was instrumental in strengthening the EU’s voice in the international financial fora. Indeed, the Communication of the Commission in October 1998, ‘Financial Services: Building a Framework for Action’ (​http:​/​​/​europa.eu.int​/​comm​/​internal_market​/​en​/​finances​/​general​/​fsen.htm​), made clear that the Commission's objective was for the EU to take a leading role in the international discussions to maintain a level playing field both within and beyond the EU, precisely at a time when the Basel 2 agreement was being negotiated. 





Supranational or non-governmental actors were crucial at the agenda-setting stage of the process, which began with the Commission’s Action Plan in 1999, and was further advanced by the Lamfalussy report in 2000-1. Both the Commission and the Committee of Wise Men acted as policy entrepreneurs by defining problems, namely, the lack of a fully integrated and properly regulated single market in financial services, and by proposing concrete solutions.​[12]​ 

Although it was not a supranational agency, the Committee of the Wise Men was beyond the direct control of the national governments. It also deliberately and strategically elicited the input of a vast array of non-governmental actors, first and foremost financial companies and independent experts (Committee of Wise Men 2000). It is also worth noting that when Baron Lamfalussy, former President of the European Monetary Institute, the predecessor of the ECB (1994-98), and former BIS senior official, was appointed as the chairperson of the Committee, the German and British governments expressed some reservations because they regarded him as a person committed to the European integration, and already decided in his opinions (Financial Times 12/7/2000). 

The EP, which was not involved in the agenda-setting stage, participated in the co-decision procedure with the Council.​[13]​ Whereas the EP supported the plan for a single market for financial services, and for more efficient and timely EU regulation, the accountability of the level 2 committee remained a concern for the EP, with the main bone of contention being the procedures and extent of comitology.  

The third supranational agency, the ECB, was also active as far as prudential supervision was concerned.​[14]​ Initially, the ECB did not welcome the formation of the many committees foreseen by the Lamfalussy Report, and it unsuccessfully attempted to reshape the agenda for reform, making the case for enhancing the role of central banks in prudential supervision on two grounds (ECB 2001b). The ECB argued that, since it was responsible for systemic stability in case of a systemic crisis, either in the banking system, insurance sector or pension funds, it would be the first institution the market looks to in such a situation.​[15]​ The ECB also pointed out that any potential conflict of interests between the conduct of monetary policy and banking supervision – an argument often used to prevent central banks from being active in prudential supervision - was ruled out in the EMU policy framework because monetary policy decisions were outside the exclusive control of national central banks (ECB 2003b, Financial times 23/3/01, 15/4/02, 11/7/02, 30/1/02).​[16]​ However, once it became clear that the Lamfalussy model gathered enough support in the EU, the ECB engaged in a rearguard action, so as to ensure that the ECB and national central banks would be present on the relevant committees.​[17]​

The outcome of the policy reform is compatible with the preferences of the Commission, because it constituted a substantial boost to its proposed Action Plan, albeit also in accordance with the preferences expressed by the member states, as argued with reference to liberal intergovernmentalism. By initially limiting the time period for the delegation of powers for the adoption of technical rules until 2004, the preferences of the EP were taken into account, although not entirely accommodated (eg no call back clause was agreed). Similarly, although the ECB was less successful in pursuing its preferences, it managed to secure central bank participation in the relevant committees. In addition, the ECB, the EP and the Commission are all involved in the implementation stage, and the Commission is likely to be an important player. It should also be noted that an outcome more in line with a supranational governance explanation would have been the creation of a set of (supranational) European regulatory and supervisory agencies, or a single super-regulator. 

The third hypothesis concerning the importance of increased transnational exchange and previous rule based integration can be linked to interdependence, with the important caveat that supranational governance assumes path dependency and an in-built integrative dynamic of the integration process, whereas interdependence does not. On the whole, there are historical similarities between the Single Market in financial services and the “1992” Single Market project, and there is an interesting parallel between the European Commission’s Financial Services Action Plan in 1999 and the Commission’s White Paper in 1985. In 2001, the European Round table of Financial Services set up a specialist group to conduct a study on the economic costs of failure to complete the single market in that area. The group was chaired by Paolo Cecchini, whose report on the potential benefits of non-Europe made him one of the most powerful architects of the re-launch of the Single Market in the 1980s (Cecchini et al 2003; Heinemann and Jopp 2002).





As far as the influence of the member states in the EU policy-making process is concerned, the empirical record suggests that, although the decision on the composition and mandate of the Group of Wise Men was taken by the national governments gathered in ECOFIN, the role of national governments was minimal in the agenda-setting phase, which largely coincided with the Commission’s Action Plan in 1999 and the drafting of the Lamfalussy Report. 

By contrast, national governments in ECOFIN meetings and European Council sessions were predominant in the decision-making phase, and this was mainly characterized by interstate bargaining, with the largest member states at centre-stage. To begin with, the ECOFIN Council approved the final version of the Report of the Committee of the Wise Men, and also its implementation, once the EP gave its assent. It was also ECOFIN, hence national finance ministers, which decided to extend the Lamfalussy framework to the whole financial sector in May 2002. Within ECOFIN, the British and German finance ministers provided the driving force, with the active support of the French government and no noticeable opposition from other governments (Financial Times 11/7/02). This indicates the convergence, or at least the congruence of the preferences of the member states. Although the French Treasury Minister, Laurent Fabius, had initially proposed a plan for the creation of a European super-regulator based in Paris, he scaled back the plan once the lack of support for it became clear (Financial Times, 12/7/2000). 

Several other features of the process fits well with liberal intergovernmentalist assumptions, such as the concern of national governments about the loss of sovereignty, and the reluctance to delegate decision-making powers. The extension of the framework to banking and insurance can be seen as an attempt by the national governments, first and foremost the British and the German, to prevent the expansion of the ECB’s competencies, or the creation of a European (supranational) regulator. Another indicator of the intergovernmental logic was the proposal by Eichel and Brown to create an (intergovernmental) European Stability Forum, which was opposed by the ECB on the grounds that the Frankfurt-based Banking Supervisory Committee was the appropriate forum to discuss the financial stability of the system (Financial Times 15/4/02). Similarly, the proposal to reconfigure the Financial Service Policy Group (FSPG) with a member state chair, which was intended to provide political oversight on financial market issues for the benefit of ECOFIN, also has a strong intergovernmental flavour.​[18]​ 

Overall, the hypothesis that the final outcome reflected the preferences of the main member states, and fell within the Pareto frontier of all the national governments is confirmed. However, since many of these preferences coincided with those of the Commission, and, by and large, the EP, it is difficult to assess whether intergovernmentalism or supranationalism have more explanatory power. With reference to the purely functional nature of the institutions created, as it is assumed by liberal intergovernmentalism, it should be noted that comitology can be interpreted either as an instrument of member states control over the activity of the Commission, or as a deliberative arena, which serves to strengthen the position of the Commission (Pollack 2003: 152; Dehousse 2003: 809-10; Joerges and Neyer 1997).

The core ‘liberal’ hypothesis is that the national preferences are the aggregated preferences of powerful domestic actors, especially economic interest groups. The financial service sectors in Britain and Germany were strongly in favour of the reform because the leading financial investors in these countries were very efficient and competitive, and hence well positioned to compete successfully in a single European financial market (Pagoulatos 2003: 184).​[19]​ Furthermore, financial operators in these countries already had a trans-European dimension and were therefore expected to benefit from access to a continental single market for financial services, regulated by efficient and timely legislation and coordinated supervision. Previous research indicates that the financial sectors in Britain, Germany, and, to a lesser extent France, represent influential lobbies in their national setting, and that they have an important role in informing the negotiating position of their national governments in the EU fora through domestic policy networks (Josselin 1996; Coleman 1993, 1994; Moran 1994).​[20]​ 

The important caveat is that the interest groups and companies that were expected to benefit most from the reform were actually transnational actors with substantial shares in activities in more than one EU country, as opposed to purely domestic actors (for a review of the domestic-international linkages, especially in the area of political economy see Caporaso 1997). For example, the Deutsch Bank, which was at the forefront in calling for reform of the system, had its headquarters in London. The investment horizons of funds and private investors have become more European, and so has their lobbying, as suggested by the activities of the European Financial Services Round Table.​[21]​ Furthermore, the dynamics of the reform process, at least at certain stages, such as the preparation of the Commission’s proposals, or the drafting of the Lamfalussy Report, deliberately encouraged input from financial market operators, which feeds into the supranational governance explanation.

On the whole, the three ex ante hypotheses derived from liberal intergovernmentalism are confirmed, subject to some qualifications. The national executives were the main actors in the decision-making stage of the project, though they were only consulted in the agenda-setting stage by the Commission, as well as by the Committee of Wise Men. The policy outcome is located within the Pareto frontier of the member states, and it especially reflects the preferences of the main players, namely, the British and German governments. However, it is also largely compatible with the preferences of the Commission, and, to a lesser extent, the EP. In the formation of national preferences, the financial sectors and large companies had the lion’s share, though it is questionable to what extent they can be regarded as domestic actors, for they tend to be transnational forces, also directly engaged in lobbying activities in Brussels.







This article has analysed the evolution of EU policy towards financial regulation and supervision in the crucial period of 1999-2004. It is argued that there is not one single winning theory that can explain the reform process and its outcome, and that a multiplicity of factors were at play. Therefore, different theoretical approaches can explain various phases of the process, as well as certain features of the outcome.​[22]​ Interdependence, which set the background for the reform, provides ‘inputs’ to other theoretical approaches. Supranational governance accounts for the crucial roles played by the Commission and the Committee of Wise Men in the agenda-setting stage. Yet, this theory is at pains in explaining the limited success of the EP and the ECB to promote their preferences. The final outcome is compatible with the preferences of the Commission, but also with those of the member states.

Intergovernmental dynamics largely account for the decision-making stage, in which the national governments, especially the finance ministers of the two largest member states, were in the driving seat and had a major bearing on the outcome. A liberal theory of interest formation, which assigns a great deal of weight to powerful domestic economic constituencies, in this instance, the financial sector, can account for the preferences of the British and German governments. Yet, companies in these sectors are largely transnational, engage in lobby activities also by-passing the national governments and are affected by increasing economic interdependence. The outcome of the reform does not entirely reflect the positions of the ‘principals’, that is, the member states, because the newly created, or reformed committees might escape the direct control of national governments.  

To bring it all together, the inventive sequencing of different theories, according to criteria that evaluate the explanatory power of each theory at different stages of the policy-making process, is more able to capture the multicausal mechanisms at work, than any theory taken on its own (cf Jupille et al. 2003). There is a significant explanatory value added in a less parsimonious and less monolithic theoretical framework, which however takes into account the scope and domain of application of different theories. Moreover, since the theories considered assign different influence to factors and actors at the global, EU and national levels, this helps to explain the multilevel mode of financial governance in the EU.

Two proposals, one empirical and one theoretical, are put forward for further study. Empirically, research on day-to-day functioning of the reformed policy framework, that is the implementation stage, would be welcome. This would alert us to the importance of the emerging European financial policy networks, which are connected to and cross-cutting well-established domestic networks. Theoretically, the sequencing of theories in EU policy-making could be tested with reference to other subject matters, for it seems to be a particularly insightful approach to analyse the multifaceted EU polity. 
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THE POLITICS OF FINANCIAL SERVICES REGULATION AND SUPERVISION REFORM IN THE EU
Table 1. Analytical framework and main findings

Theories	Hypotheses	Empirical testing
Interdependence	1) EU level: SM and EMU increased intra- EU financial exchange2) Global level: technological changes,, regulatory activities of international bodies, international competitiveness 	1) Risk of regulatory failures with cross-border repercussions, expected economic benefits 2) New financial instruments, need to coordinate EU position on Basel II, competition with the USbackground-setting
SupranationalGovernance	1) Supranational agents, ie the Commission, the EP and the ECB play a crucial role 2) The final outcome reflects the preferences of supranational actors3) Importance of previous rule-based integration, eg SM, EMU 	1) Supranational actors were important in the agenda-setting stage2) The final outcome conformed to the preferences of the Commission, EP and (less) ECB, but also overlapping preferences with the MS3) Path-dependency/spill-overs of the SM and EMU
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^1	  See also http://europa.eu.int/comm/internal_market/en/finances/banks/246.htm accessed in September 2004.
^2	  The terminology of ‘level 1’, ‘level 2’, ‘level 3’ is used in the official documents outlining the new framework. 
^3	  “Comitology” refers to the delegation of implementing powers by the Council to the Commission for the execution of EU legislation. Representatives of the Member States, acting through Committees called “comitology committees”, assist the Commission in the execution of the implementing powers conferred on it. 
^4	  The method of process-tracing consists in analysing data on events, actions, expectations, and other factors that link putative causes to observed effects.
^5	  According to the congruence procedure, theoretical predictions concerning the outcome of the dependent variable are compared with the real outcome. If the real outcome is consistent with the predictions, then there is at least a presumption of a causal relationship.
^6	  Liberal intergovernmentalism has been used to explain the making of  the Treaty of Nice, starting with the Treaty of Rome, the Single European Act (SEA), the TEU, and the Treaty of Amsterdam. For a critique Wincott 1995.
^7	  http://europa.eu.int/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=SPEECH/02/44&format=HTML&aged=1&language=EN&guiLanguage=en accessed in September 2004.
^8	  Duisenberg, Hearing of the Economic and Monetary Committee of the European Parliament, 8 October 2003, Padoa Schioppa, Hearing of the Economic and Monetary Affairs Committee of the European Parliament 10 July 2002. 
^9	  For example, in 2004 the share of non-domestic branches and subsidiaries of credit institutions in the banking assets of the EU-15 reached more than 20%. Furthermore, euro area banks have significant cross-border holdings of interbank loans, equal nearly 30% of total interbank loans and of cross-border securities issued by non-banks,equal to more than 40% of total securities holdings, both up from 20% in 1997 (ECB 2004b: 10). As a result of the ongoing consolidation and organic growth of the sector, the size of the average institution in the EU-15 had almost doubled when compared with 1997, reaching more than €3.5 billion of assets (ECB 2004b: 8). See also Committee of Wise Men 2000: 2-3; Lannoo 1999.
^10	  In the period from 1997 to 2003, almost 2.200 credit institutions, or around 23% of the number of institutions existing in 1997, ceased to exist. This is mainly attributable to mergers and acquisitions (ECB 2004b, 2003c).
^11	  For example, the capitalization of European stock exchanges remains significantly behind those of the US equivalents. Taken together, European securities markets are still only about half of the size of those in the US.
^12	  The members of the committee were: Bengt Ryden, Chief Executive of the Stockholm Stock Exchange. Cornelius Herkströter, a Director of Billiton Plc and Professor of International Management at Amsterdam University. Luigi Spaventa, President of the Italian Bourse authority, the CONSOB. Nigel Wicks, fomer permanent secretary of the Treasury. Norbert Walter, Chief Economist at the Deutsche Bank Group. The rapporteur was David Wright, Director Financial Markets, Directorate General for Internal Markets, European Commission. 
^13	  The Committee of Wise Men was also indirectly involved in this tug-of-war, as in the final version of the report; it rejected the EP’s request for a call back clause.
^14	  In the EU/Eurozone, the ECB-ESCB-Eurosystem have no direct responsibility for banking supervision, however Art. 105(5) (Art. III-77.5 in the Constitutional treaty) states that ‘The ESCB shall contribute to the smooth conduct of policies pursued by the competent authorities relating to the prudential supervision of credit institutions and the stability of the financial system’. Moreover, ‘The Council may, acting unanimously on a proposal from the Commission and after consulting the ECB and after receiving the assent of the European Parliament, confer upon the ECB specific tasks concerning policies relating to the prudential supervision of credit institutions and other financial institutions with the exception of insurance undertakings’ (Art. 105(6)).
^15	  Since its creation, the ECB, and particularly, its first president, Wim Duiserberg, the member of the Executive Board dealing with banking supervision, Tommaso Padoa Schioppa, and the Bundesbank chair of the Banking Supervisory Committee of the ECB, Edgar Meister, have beefed up the banking supervision arm. The Banking Supervisory Committee of the ECB has been strengthened with a secretariat at the ECB, and the ECB also tried to make it independent from the ECB Governing Council, for example, by reporting to financial ministers.
^16	  See also Padoa-Schioppa, Hearing of the  Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs, European Parliament, 10 July 2002.
^17	  Duisenberg, Hearing of the Economic and Monetary Committee of the European Parliament, 8 October 2002; see also ECB 2004a. One explanation for the stance of the ECB is that the national central banks that constitute the bulk of its decision making body, are eager to increase their role in banking supervision, once they have lost their role in setting monetary policy (Financial Times, 30/1/02).  
^18	  This body would comprise one high level representative of the relevant ministry per member states and one alternate; the Commission would have one member, ensuring the representation of the chair of the level 2 committees and the ECB and level 3 chairs would have observer status.
^19	  See Simmons 2001: 592-95 with reference to the UK financial center, interviews with financial service operators, London, July 2004.
^20	  Moreover, the British, German and French authorities aimed at promoting their respective national financial centers, as the main European financial center.
^21	  In addition, the European mortgage federation, the Federation Bancaire de l’union europeenne, the UNI Europe expressed their support for the extension of Lamfalussy framework to banking.
^22	  Richardson 1996; Jupille, Caporaso and Checkel 2003.
